Pietro Daniel Maia da Silva and Mateus Degasperi Ieker
28 de out. de 2025
Translated by Clara Antunes Brum
Edited by Mariana Romling Rotheia Andrade
In light of the current landscape of international trade cooperation, one can observe a disruption of the liberal economic narrative, driven primarily by actions taken by the United States of America, most notably the imposition of tariffs on imports based on a protectionist outlook. Accordingly, when specifically analyzing the trade relations and current tariffs between the United States and China, one of China’s retaliatory strategies has brought a particular market into focus, namely the rare earth mining market.
Rare earth elements (REEs) are a group of 17 metallic chemical elements widely distributed in the Earth's crust, but in low concentrations. These elements include scandium (Sc), yttrium (Y), and the 15 elements of the lanthanide series. At the same time, cerium (Ce) is the most abundant of the REEs and the 25th most abundant element in the Earth's crust. These elements are used in the production of electronic devices, land and air vehicle engines, magnetic resonance imaging, catalysts, optical fibers, among others.
From this perspective, considering that REEs are such a significant component in global technological development, Chinese reserves in 2024 accounted for 49% of the world’s total. However, shortly thereafter, it can be observed that Brazil accounts for 23% of the world’s reserves of these elements, according to the 2025 edition of the U.S. Mineral Commodity Summaries, revealing significant potential for the development of this strategically important
sector in contemporary international trade.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to understand how the interest in and the actual process of rare earth extraction in Brazil began, as well as the current outlook. In parallel, this article considers it essential to analyze and present sovereignty and sustainability as the key solutions for the growth of the Brazilian rare earth industry. Within this context, the main objective of this article is to present a perspective of opportunity for the development of the Brazilian rare earth industry, given the current scenario of restricted circulation of this crucial
component. Formation of interest in rare earth exploration in Brazil
Although REEs are now fundamental to various sectors, their importance was gradually recognized by states as the need for technological advancements emerged. Consequently, the relevance of these rare earth elements was first acknowledged by nations with higher development indices, naturally.
In the history of Brazilian rare earth exploration, this condition is evident, particularly due to the indirect nature of the initial “exploration” of REEs, which began between 1885 and 1886 with the extraction of monazite from the sands of the municipality of Prado, located in the far south of Bahia. The main destinations of these REEs were Austria and Germany, where thorium (Th) and cerium (Ce) nitrates were sought for the development of gas lamp mantles, demonstrating precisely that developed countries already understood the importance of these components for technological development (SOUSA FILHO, P. C. DE; SERRA, O. A, 2014).
Thus, during this period, Brazil played a major role in providing materials that literally illuminated Europe, in an era marked by the European Belle Époque. This role as a significant supplier of minerals signalled the beginning of Brazil’s growing interest in rare earth exploration. However, the obstacle was that such activity did not substantially translate into economic growth.
Purified REEs entered Brazil’s industrial landscape through private initiatives. Between 1950 and 1960, the country came to master the extraction and separation process necessary to obtain high-purity oxides. The technological development achieved within the REE industry enabled the production of a variety of products. For a better understanding, according to a report by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) on the current situation
and prospects for rare earths, there is a range of classifications for these products:
(i) ore-bearing minerals;
(ii) chemical concentrates;
(iii) high-purity oxides; and
(iv) metals and metallic alloys. (BNDES)
That said, Brazil succeeded in reaching the stage of producing oxides of high purity, contributing, for example, to the manufacture of metallic bars. Vis-à-vis this progress, academia advanced hand in hand with technological development through the expansion of research at the end of the 1950s. Around 1957 , these efforts led to the creation of a line of investigations into rare earth chemistry at the Institute of Chemistry of the University of São Paulo (IQ-USP). Nevertheless, only recently have REEs once again rekindled government attention, prompted by the recognition of the economic vulnerability that could arise from the lack of such resources. In addition to the clear acknowledgment of Brazil's significant potential in this field, the realization that “clean” technologies (such as wind turbines and hybrid vehicles) and strategic industries (such as oil and communications) depend heavily on the availability of REEs has led to new initiatives in different sectors. Scientists gathered at the 4th National Meeting on Rare Earths (held in Aracaju, April 2010) sent a letter to the Minister of Science and Technology alerting authorities to the need to resume rare earth production.
In response, the Interministerial Working Group on Strategic Minerals was established by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) and the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation (MCTI) through Interministerial Ordinance No. 614/2010 on June 30, 2010. Sovereignty and sustainability as solutions for the Brazilian rare earth industry
The debate over Brazilian dominance of rare earths emerges in a context of global reorganization of the international division of labor. As analyzed by Diógenes Moura Breda, “rare earths and data infrastructure form the strategic core of the new sectors of the world economy” (Breda, 2025, Carta Capital). These two pillars, energy and information, underpin the technological and military power of the great powers. According to the author, “those who control this core concentrate extraordinary profits and, naturally, economic, political, and military power.” This observation revisits, in contemporary terms, the argument from his 2011 monograph on the Scientific- Technical Revolution, which asserted that Latin America occupies a dependent position, destined to supply raw materials and import technology.
This peripheral condition is clearly visible in the case of REEs. Brazil holds 23% of the world's known reserves but accounts for only 0.005% of global production (Breda, 2025). Structurally, this means that the country exports raw technological potential and imports added value, reproducing what Theotonio dos Santos called “dependent accumulation,” in which science and technology are appropriated by monopolistic centers. As Breda points out, “handing over the exploitation of rare earths to foreign companies [...] would be repeating the old pattern: intensive mining, export of raw materials without added value, quick profits for the few, and environmental liabilities for all.”
The proposed solution converges with the tradition of national sovereignty through state leadership: the creation of a public rare earths company, with monopoly over extraction and refining, integrating scientific research, technological innovation, and environmental regulation. Breda argues that “only a state-owned company could regulate the pace of exploration according to national interests and direct part of the mineral income to public universities and research centers, creating its own high-tech capabilities.” This proposal recalls the historical role of Petrobras, whose founding was a direct result of a project of energy, scientific, and industrial autonomy, a gesture of self-determination that transformed oil into a vector for development.
Analogously, a “Petrobras of Rare Earths” would serve as an instrument to break the new technological dependency imposed by the green and digital revolutions. As Breda emphasizes, “national control is the rule in strategic and emerging sectors,” citing China, the US, and South Korea as examples of countries that have partially or totally nationalized their critical mineral supply chains. This strategy is not merely a form of economic protectionism, but constitutes a policy of scientific sovereignty, capable of ensuring that innovation and mineral wealth contribute to the country's social and environmental development.
Domestically, this state-owned company should incorporate the principles of green mining described by researchers at CETEM and BNDES: technologies such as bioleaching, low- impact hydrometallurgical processes, and the reuse of radioactive waste. These approaches point to a sustainable and circular mining model, capable of combining technological growth with ecological preservation. Just as Petrobras once boosted national engineering and human capital development, a state-owned rare earths company could integrate science, the environment, and industry within a unified sustainable sovereignty project.
Finally, Breda proposes expanding the issue to the regional level: “a Latin American articulation, perhaps via CELAC, could not only strengthen each country, but also renew the regional integration project with a concrete horizon: the sovereign use of critical minerals to compete for a place in the economy of the future.” In this horizon, Brazil’s sovereignty over its rare earths is not only an economic goal, but a civilizational project, capable of repositioning the country within the geopolitics of the energy transition and artificial intelligence.
The authors are solely responsible for the content of this article. The published content does not reflect the views of the Pour le Brésil association or any of its members.
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